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Gifts as Economic Signals and Social 
Symbols' 
Colin Camerer 
University of Pennsylvania 
Gift-giving has often puzzled economists, especially because effi- 
cient gifts-like cash or giving exactly what a person asks for- 
seem crass or inappropriate. It is shown in a formal game-theoretic 
model that gifts serve as "signals" of a person's intentions about 
future investment in a relationship, and inefficient gifts can be bet- 
ter signals. Other explanations for the inefficiency of gift giving are 
advanced, and some stylized facts about gift-giving practices are 
described (many of which are consistent with the signaling view of 
gifts). 
People give others gifts, which are often reciprocated. Appropriate gifts 
are often inefficient: givers buy goods different from those receivers 
would like. These practices, especially the inefficiency ofgifts, are a little 
puzzling to economists. 
The Anthropological Approach 
A distinguished line of anthropologists has been interested in gift giving 
(Boas 1895; Malinowski 1922; Mauss 1967), perhaps because of the ex- 
travagance and importance of gift-giving rituals in primitive societies. 
The "potlatches" of coastal cultures in northwestern North America are 
typical (Boas 1920; Barnett 1938); Clyde Belshaw (1965) says a potlatch is 
a "complex institution of ceremonial wealth accumulation," centered on 
the numaym, "essentially a spatrilineal descent group with several well- 
defined corporate functions." Once admitted into the numaym, people 
give gifts to others, but repayment is expected, at huge interest rates. By 
"lending" to others through gift giving, people can build up enormous 
wealth. On ceremonial occasions, "the greatest potlatchers" would "dem- 
1 Thanks to Andrew Daughety, Mary Douglas, Gerry Faulhaber, Jack Hirschleifer, 
Howard Kunreuther, George Loewenstein, Ari Vepsalainen, Keith Weigelt, and the 
editors and referees of this supplement for encouragement and comments. Requests for 
reprints should be sent to Colin Camerer, Decision Sciences Department, The Whar- 
ton School, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19104. 
? 1988 by The University of Chicago. All rights reserved. 
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onstrate how rich and magnificient hey are by destroying their most 
valued items" (cf. Veblen [1934] on "conspicuous consumption" and 
Thompson [1979, chap. 9] on hog exchange in New Guinea). The pot- 
latch and similar orgies of gift giving suggest that primitive gift giving 
helps clarify social roles, wealth, or status. Gifts may serve similar social 
functions in modern societies, but modern mechanisms may serve these 
functions even better (e.g., general consumption; see Douglas and Isher- 
wood 1978). 
In most anthropological accounts, reciprocity is essential-accepting a 
gift implies a solemn obligation of repayment (as in accepting a loan). 
This insistence on reciprocity suggests that, for primitives, gifts actually 
provide insurance or credit,2 substituting for exchange in formal, anony- 
mous markets (see Posner 1980; Hemenway 1984). If so, the flamboyant 
gift giving chronicled by anthropologists i not a good guide to modern 
gift giving, and it is especially misleading to assume that modern gift 
giving must be reciprocal (it is not always so), as many scholars have 
(e.g., Schwartz 1967, p. 8; Titmuss 1971, p. 72; Akerlof 1982, p. 550). 
The Sociological Approach 
Sociologists have typically expanded the view of anthropologists hat gifts 
symbolize and convey meaning. Indeed, gifts might serve many social 
functions (see, e.g., Schwartz 1967), including conveying identity, con- 
trolling and subordinating, conveying unfriendliness, reducing status 
anxiety, enforcing distributive justice, providing suspense or insulation, 
defining roup boundaries, and atoning for unseen social deviations. 
The Economic Approach 
In the simplest theory of consumer choice, there is no place for the sort of 
inefficient gift giving we routinely observe between people; if consumers 
know their own tastes and markets function smoothly, givers should give 
cash (if anything) rather than trying to guess the desires of receivers. But 
this prescription seems to betray the spirit of gift giving. 
We might "explain" the behavior of givers of inefficient gifts, in their 
utility functions, by supposing a distaste for giving cash, by supposing a 
wife's utility function contains her husband's utility as an argument, or by 
positing educational motives-perhaps a giver knows more about a recip- 
ient's tastes, current or future, than the recipient does (as with practical 
gifts to children). Or we can blame transaction costs and market failure, 
2 That is, gifts are like loans in primitive societies, but loans from modern banks are 
not like gifts. 
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since, as Hemenway (1984, p. 54) notes, "On a trip I might see something 
unusual and inexpensive that a good friend might like. Buying it as a gift 
could prove more efficient han any available market arrangement." In 
an ongoing relationship, gifts might be tokens used to achieve equity or 
settle contracts after ex post observation of ex ante unobservables (cf. 
Fama 1980, on managerial contracts), but why use inefficient gifts as 
tokens? "Because gifts are more pleasant to receive" is an observation not 
an explanation. These economic explanations seem hollow and tautolog- 
ical. Furthermore, they offer no positive explanations for institutions of 
gift giving (such as holidays), and they do not squarely confront he 
question of inefficiency. 
In this article, I begin with the sociologists' observation that gifts are 
symbolic of some qualities of gift givers or receivers; gifts are actions 
people take that convey meaning. In the terminology of information eco- 
nomics, such meaningful actions are "signals" (Spence 1974; see also 
Rothschild and Stiglitz 1976). A "signaling equilibrium" results when 
expectations about what signals mean are fulfilled by behavior. 
The important difference between the economists' use of the term "sig- 
nal" and the sociologists' use of the term "symbol" is that economic signals 
mean something because people who do not have the characteristics the 
signals convey cannot afford those signals, by definition. (If they could, 
the signals would no longer mean anything.) Education is an example. A 
college degree signals intelligence (and many other qualities) because col- 
lege degrees are too difficult for unintelligent people to get. If degrees 
were easy to get, they would not mean anything about intelligence. 
Defining signals in this way makes them amenable to economic analysis 
of models in which agents choose signals to convey information that 
makes them more productive and happier. 
One signaling explanation of inefficient gift giving is described and 
formalized in the next section, and several related explanations are ad- 
vanced. After that, some general observations about modern conventions 
of gift giving are described, including some facts that are not consistent 
with the signaling view. The last section is a conclusion. 
GIFTS AS SIGNALS 
The argument that gifts are signals applies best to courtship between 
unrelated strangers-for example, potential spouses or business partners 
(including organizations).3 The signaling explanation is not especially 
3For example, anthropologist Marcel Mauss (1967, p. 71) wrote: "The payments to 
chiefs ... are for the most part counter-prestations made not solely in order to pay for 
goods and service, but also to maintain a profitable alliance which it would be unwise 
S 182 
Gifts 
helpful in explaining gift giving between groups of people or charitable 
gift giving by individuals or organizations (see, e.g., Titmuss 1971; Arrow 
1972; Kurz 1978). 
Consider an earnest young suitor, expecting a lifetime of familial pro- 
duction with his fiancee (given her consent); he will gladly "sink" the costs 
of a diamond ring and expensive dinners against the expected gains of 
joint production, if he must, to convince her of his intentions and elicit 
her cooperation. The lusty bachelor whose planning extends only to dawn 
cannot afford such costly investments, ceteris paribus, since he expects 
less gain from a short-term relationship with his lady of that evening. 
In courtship situations like this, gift giving can sort potential partners 
according to their intentions (i.e., their investment plans). Furthermore, 
gift giving will often be reciprocal (though not always), because gifts are 
meant to spur investments that are reciprocal. However, the reciprocity 
involved here is very different from the reciprocity that is so important in 
anthropological accounts. Potential mates or partners hope courtship gift 
giving is reciprocal, because in my model it takes two people to make a 
relationship. In the anthropological accounts, reciprocity is important 
because gifts are like loans rather than signals. 
Because gift giving is often reciprocal, inefficient gifts that are not 
worth much to the receiver may be better signals than efficient gifts, since 
they help signal the receiver's intentions. Accepting an overpriced dinner 
instead of its cash equivalent has an opportunity cost to the receiver; so, 
incurring that cost is simultaneously a signal of the giver's intentions and 
of the receiver's intentions. (This is shown more formally below.) 
A Biological Analogy 
The clever account of animal gift giving by Dawkins (1976) is so remark- 
ably like the signaling model of human gift giving during courtship that it 
is worth detailing. Like most sociobiological stories, the argument begins 
with selfish genes reproducing themselves as swiftly as possible. Genes 
that devise ingenious ways for surviving or propagating come to domi- 
nate in number. We then suppose that observable animal features, and 
perhaps social behavior, must have evolutionary value or else they would 
not have survived (though this reasoning can be tautological, as Lewontin 
[1979] warns). 
The animal "battle of the sexes" is a simple conflict: "Each individual 
wants as many surviving children as possible. The less he or she is obliged 
to reject, as for instance partnership between fishing tribes and tribes of hunters and 
potters." This is exactly the signaling argument, in a primitive setting where tribes 
signal between each other as people do. 
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to invest in any one of those children, the more children he or she can 
have. The obvious way to achieve this desirable state of affairs is to 
induce your sexual partner to invest more than his or her fair share of 
resources in each child, leaving you free to have other children with other 
partners." Dawkins explains that males can often impregnate females and 
leave because a female, thus placed in a cruel bind, must raise the child 
alone or else watch it die. She will raise the child. So, "the things which a 
female might do if she is deserted by her mate . . . all have the air of 
making the best of a bad job. Is there anything a female can do to reduce 
the extent to which her mate exploits her in the first place? She has a 
strong card in her hand . .. the dowry of a large, nutritious egg. A male 
who successfully copulates gains a valuable food reserve for his offspring. 
The female is potentially in a position to drive a hard bargain before she 
copulates" (my emphasis). The "hard bargain" that females drive, accord- 
ing to Dawkins, is the screening of suitors for fidelity and domesticity by 
"insisting on a long engagement period" and engaging in courtship rituals 
that "often include considerable pre-copulation investment by the male." 
The male's gifts might include building a nest or feeding the female a lot 
of food. 
Dawkins shows that an "evolutionary stable equilibrium" (Maynard 
Smith 1974) is reached if some fraction of the female population is "coy" 
and demands gifts and other females are "fast" and require no invest- 
ment; whereas some males are "philanderers" who lose patience with 
mates who demand gifts, and other "faithful" males patiently offer gifts 
while waiting to copulate. An equilibrium exists when no type of animal 
(or gene) can increase its proportion of the population. 
A Formal Model 
A game-theoretic model can show how costly and inefficient gifts must be 
to signal effectively. The casual reader can skip ahead to the next section, 
and the avid reader can find technical details in the Appendix. 
We start with two players, 1 and 2-prospective mates or business 
partners-who choose separately whether to "invest" (I) or "not invest" 
(N) during a fixed period. Investment includes purchases of household 
goods, psychological or physical sacrifices, time spent building a relation- 
ship or raising children, and so forth. Since this investment is slippery to 
define, contracts are obviously not enforceable, and we assume that play- 
ers do not know whether their partner has invested until after the period 
is over. (We can define a period as that length of time that elapses before a
lack of investment can be detected.) Since both investments affect play- 
ers' utilities, there are four possible levels of investment-related utility for 
each player. Assume there are only two patterns of these four utilities: 
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"willing" (W)-type players prefer investing if their partner invests, but 
"unwilling" (U)-type players always prefer not to invest. 
That is, setting the no-investment utility V(N, N) = 0 as a benchmark 
and using the following general notation (shown for a W-type player 1), 
VI (I, I) = R(W) Romance, (1) 
VI (N, I) = C(W) Cheating, (2) 
V' (I, N) = Q(W) unreQuited love, (3) 
then an implicit definition of players' types is simply 
R(W) > C(W) > 0 > Q(W) (4) 
C(U) > R(U) > O > Q(U). (5) 
That is, W-type players prefer romance to cheating (they will invest only 
if the other invests), and U-type players prefer cheating to romance (they 
will not invest, even if the other invests). Both kinds of players like Q 
least of all. 
The investment game.-With payoffs thus defined, we can model the 
investments of the courting partners as a one-period, noncooperative 
game, which means that players cannot communicate about and enforce 
their choices of strategies and they cannot give gifts or convey their 
willingness. 
In this simple investment game, unwilling players never invest (by 
definition), and both willing players invest if and only if their expected 
values from investing are above their expected values from not investing 
(see App.). Define the prior probabilities of willingness as P1 and P2. 
(These could be interpreted as the chances that the players willingly in- 
vest until they reach some milestone, such as having a month-long rela- 
tionship, becoming intimate, or getting engaged or married.) Intuitively, 
when willing player l's invest, they trade off the expected benefit P2R(W) 
against the expected loss (1 - P2)Q(W) and the opportunity cost of not 
investing, P2C(W). They prefer to invest only if P2 is above an investment 
threshold, which depends on R(W), Q(W), and C(W). 
More formally, the game is a noncooperative game of imperfect infor- 
mation, because, contrary to the assumption made in much of game 
theory, players do not have the same information about the game: they 
each know their own types. John Harsanyi (1967-68) argues that it is 
logical to model such "games of incomplete information" by assuming 
that there are some things not everybody knows ("private information") 
but that everybody knows4 the probability distribution of exactly what 
4 "Everybody knows" is formalized in game theory as "common knowledge" (Lewis 
1969; Aumann 1976). 
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that private information is. In this case, we suppose players know their 
own types, and the probability that their partner is a willing type. Then, 
an elaborate game is played in which players choose from contingency 
strategies that specify a choice for all the possible types a player might be. 
These will be strategies of the sort "If willing, choose I; if unwilling, 
choose N," written (W, I; U, N). For a simultaneous noncooperative 
choice of two contingency strategies, the payoffs are the expected values 
of the possible utility outcomes in definitions (1)-(3), weighted by the 
probability that each outcome will result. 
Since players are assumed not to communicate and to choose simulta- 
neously, we search for Nash equilibria-pairs of strategies, one for each 
player, that are best responses for both.5 The strategies described 
above-unwilling players never invest, willing players invest only if both 
probabilities P1 and P2 are above their investment hresholds-are a 
unique Nash equilibrium. 
Why signaling is needed. -Players will not invest early in a relation- 
ship, when either P1 or P2 is low (and below the investment threshold), or 
before an important commitment, when Q(W) is especially large (so that 
the probability threshold is large). However, players will invest if they 
can somehow discover a partner's willingness. Biological predictors and 
verbal pleas are notoriously unreliable (because they are not hard to fake), 
so partners need an indicator that is too costly to fake-a signal.6 These 
signals do not necessarily have to be personal gifts, but gifts will work 
very well because the gift givers are known to the recipients (unless they 
are given by secret admirers), as we require in our analysis of the game, 
and gifts clearly mark the informational purpose and target of the sig- 
nal. Thus, we shall now allow players to communicate in a very limited 
way by deciding simultaneously, and without further communication, 
whether or not to give gifts before any investment akes place. 
I define G1 and G2 as the signaling costs to players 1 and 2 in income, 
time, and so on.7 I define "efficiency" el as the marginal utility of player 
2's gifts to receiver 1 (and I define e2 similarly). Efficient or practical 
gifts-cash or a gift chosen by the receiver-will have el = 1, because 
5 That is, (X, Y) is a Nash equilibrium if and only if X is player l's best response to the 
hypothesized choice of Y by player 2, and Y is player 2's best response to the hy- 
pothesized choice of X by player 1. See, e.g., Luce and Raiffa (1957). 
6 This signal is actually quite different from nest building and other animal behavior 
discussed by Dawkins (1976). In his model, all animals are assumed to be unwilling, 
and requiring ifts imposes a marginal cost that makes desertion uneconomical. In my 
model, requiring a gift signals willingness, and willing human animals will even 
volunteer to give gifts to distinguish themselves from unwilling heartbreakers. 
'So, L1G, and L2G2 are the costs of the signals in utility terms-the income cost times 
the marginal utility of income Ll or L2. For simplicity, I drop the marginal utility of 
income terms in the analysis. 
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given free choice receivers will pick gifts that have a marginal utility 
equal to the marginal utility of income. Frivolous gifts will have el = 0, 
since they generate no marginal utility, and "unfriendly" gifts (see 
Schwartz 1967, p. 5) may even have negative values of el. The puzzle I 
seek to explain is why it seems necessary for el to be less than one for a gift 
to signal a person's intentions appropriately. 
The two-stage signaling-investment game. -Signaling makes the court- 
ship game a two-stage game. In the first stage, players choose a "contin- 
gency strategy" of the form (W, G1; U, 0), which dictates whether or not 
they would invest in the signal (give gifts) if they were each possible type. 
Then, knowing their actual type, they execute the contingency strategy 
applied to their actual type. After seeing their partners' signals (or lack 
thereof) and knowing the equilibrium contingency strategy, each player 
updates his or her information about the partner's type. Then players 
choose whether to invest in the second (investment) stage. The payoffs 
that players anticipate, and on the basis of which they choose their two- 
stage strategies, are the total payoffs from both stages of the game. 
Equilibria in the Two-Stage Gift-giving Game 
In this two-stage game, there are many equilibria, depending in idiosyn- 
cratic ways on the exact values of the probabilities and utilities. Figure 1 
summarizes the results (see the App. for details). If C(W) < C(U) (unwill- 
Probability that 
Player 2 is 1 
"willing", P2 
ONE-SIDED GIFT-GIVING 
INVESTMENT 
(only 1 gives a gift) NO GIFT-GIVING, INVESTMENT 
- Q(W) see Table A.4 
R(W) - C(U) - Q(W) 
 
(neither 1nor 2 needs to give gifts R(W) - QU) - Q(W) ~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~to elicit investment) 
NO GIFT-GIVING 
NO INVESTMENT see Table A.3 
threshold (1 needs t,o gfiveagft I's investment yIn st ie a gi , threshold ~~~~but can't afford to) 
11 see Table AA.4 
_ QM 
R(W) - C(W) -Q(W) - -__ . - - - - - - - 
TWO-SIDED GIFT-GIVING NO GIFT-GIVING ONE-SIDED GIFT-GIVING 
INVESTMENT NO INVESTMENT INVESTMENT 
(I and 2 both give gifts, (2 needs to give a gift, (only 2 gives a gift) 
both signal) but can't afford to) 
see Table A.2 
0 1 
Probability that 
Player 1 is 
2's investment _ - Q(W) - Q(W) "willing, PI 
threshold R(W) - C(W) - Q(W) R(W) - C(U) - Q(W) 
FIG. 1.-Bayesian Nash equilibria, noncooperative gift-giving, investment 
game (assuming C(W) < C(U)). 
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ing cheaters are happier than willing cheaters), as seems most likely, then 
there are four kinds of equilibria:8 
1. If both probabilities P1 and P2 are below the investment hresholds 
from the one-stage investment game, players know that no investment 
will take place unless willing types distinguish themselves by signaling. 
Thus, "two-sided gift giving" is the unique Nash equilibrium. Both play- 
ers give gifts, if willing, and unwilling players do not. If a gift is received, 
a player can infer that the partner is willing, so a willing partner then 
invests. (This "separating" equilibrium enables a willing player whose 
love is unrequited by an unwilling partner to find that out after wasting 
only a gift, rather than wasting a more expensive investment.) 
2. If both probabilities P1 and P2 are above the investment hresholds, 
"no gift giving, investment" is the equilibrium. Players do not need to 
give gifts in order to elicit investment from a partner, and giving gifts 
does not elicit any additional investment or prevent cheating by an un- 
willing partner, so neither player gives a gift. 
3. If one probability is moderately high (P1, say) and the other probabil- 
ity is below the investment hreshold, then the low-probability player 2 
needs to give a gift to win player l's trust, but player 2 cannot afford to 
(even if he is willing) because the required gift is too expensive. (That is, 
player 2 earns a negative net return after buying the gift, signaling his 
type, and then earning either R[W] or Q[W]. He would prefer not to play 
and to earn nothing.) Hence, a "no signaling, no investment" equilibrium 
results. (If C[U] < C[W], this equilibrium never occurs because the gift 
is affordable to any player whose probability is above the investment 
threshold.) 
4. If one probability is very high (P1, say) and the other probability is 
low, then the low-probability player 2 can afford the gift. A "one-sided 
gift-giving, investment" equilibrium results in which only the low- 
probability player gives a gift. The difference between this equilibrium 
and the no-signaling equilibrium in (3) is that if P1 is high, then player 2 
can give the gift and expect a high-enough probability of R(W) and a low- 
enough probability of Q(W) to make the net return positive. In (3), the 
probability of R(W) is too low, and the probability of Q(W) is too high. 
In the Appendix, I analyze the gift-giving game played cooperatively- 
that is, when the players agree on enforceable joint strategies. The 
cooperative game has almost exactly the same result as the noncoopera- 
tive game, except that the equilibrium always involves two-sided gift 
giving (followed by investment by willing players), regardless of the levels 
8 If C(W) > C(U), then the "two-sided gift-giving" region in fig. 1 expands outward, 
completely engulfing the "no gift-giving, no investment" regions and expanding into 
the "one-sided gift-giving, investment" and "no gift-giving, investment" regions. 
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of probabilities. The difference between the various noncooperative re- 
sults (depicted in fig. 1) and the single cooperative result is that in the 
noncooperative game players move unilaterally, taking their partners' 
moves as fixed. Thus, players will selfishly refrain from gift giving if they 
expect others to give gifts. In the cooperative game, essentially, players 
move together, and, since it is always an improvement for willing players 
to give gifts (if both could only agree to do so), they will do so in the 
cooperative game, even if they cannot agree to do so in the noncoopera- 
tive game.9 
The cost and efficiency of equilibrium gifts.-For the gift-giving 
equilibria to hold, the cost of the gift signals G1 and G2 must satisfy 
P2R(W) > G1 > P2C(U) (6) 
P1R(W) > G2 > P1C(U). (7) 
That is, the cost of player l's gift should exceed what an unwilling player 
1 could expect to get (P2C[U]) by sneakily giving a gift, then cheating 
during the investment stage. But a gift should not be so expensive that it 
costs more than the willing player expects to get (P2R[W]) from signaling, 
then investing. 
In the two-stage game, it does not matter what the efficiency levels are 
because, in a Nash equilibrium, each player takes the other's moves 
(including the gift giving) as given; so a willing player assumes he may get 
a gift regardless of whether he gives a gift. To introduce a role for 
efficiency, we can suppose there is an initial stage in which players must 
pay some minimal entry costs T1 and T2 to enter the two-stage signaling- 
investment game of courtship. (These costs might include the costs of 
making a date or arranging an occasion for gift giving.) An unwilling 
player 1 can then pay the entry cost and earn a net expected value of -T 
+ e1G2P2, because there is a P2 chance his partner has paid the entry cost 
and will then give a gift with value e1G2. The unwilling player 1 can be 
deterred from participating at all (though willing players are not deterred; 
see App.), thus saving player 2 the cost of a wasted gift, if 
e1 < T11G2P2 (8) 
and, for player 2, 
e2 < T21G1Pl. (9) 
These conditions place upper limits on how efficient (or "practical") gifts 
should be. Gifts can be somewhat practical, but they may not be too 
9 Because the cooperative game always enables partners to find partners through gift 
giving but the noncooperative game does not, it brings a new twist o Paul Samuelson's 
dictum that "cooperative game theory represents love in economics." 
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practical, or else unwilling types will play the signaling game merely to 
collect gifts. At last, we have a formal explanation of why gifts need to be 
inefficient to signal intentions well. 
Another explanation for efficiency arises if we force both types of play- 
ers to give gifts of identical costs. Then the willing types will signal their 
types by asking for inefficient gifts, while unwilling types will ask for 
perfectly efficient gifts (see App. for details). 
Inefficient gift giving is a double-edged sword, however: it protects the 
giver from gift collectors, but it also costs the willing giver the opportu- 
nity to receive gifts he really enjoys. Both players are happier exchanging 
the inefficient gifts in (8) and (9) only if (see App.) 
(1 - P1)1P1 > G11G2 > P21(l - P2) (10) 
These inequalities reflect he tradeoff between the benefits of giving an 
inefficient gift (which deters) and the opportunity cost of receiving an 
inefficient gift (which is harmful). If the prior probabilities P1, P2 are 
small, then inefficient gift giving does more good (deterrence) than harm 
(opportunity cost), but, if the probabilities are large, as when a relation- 
ship is mature, giving inefficient gifts does more harm than good, and 
players prefer to exchange efficient gifts. 
The optimal gift costs from (6) and (7) and the optimal efficiency levels 
from (8) and (9) paint a picture of the life cycle of gift giving that is 
somewhat familiar in courtship. On meeting, a nervous couple (with low 
probabilities of willingness) initially prefer to exchange inexpensive, 
inefficient gifts that have only sentimental value. Assuming that they 
gradually become more certain that their partners are willing (or else the 
relationship ends), they gradually give more expensive, more practical 
gifts. Eventually, perhaps, they simply buy themselves what they want 
with their partners' money. 
Complicating the Model 
Of course, the model is only a skeletal abstraction of actual gift giving. 
Usually, gift giving occurs in multiple rounds, in which successively more 
expensive, and perhaps more efficient, gifts are given. We could interpret 
these as equilibria of a game in which there are more than just two types, 
so that each successively more expensive gift serves to distinguish players 
from the several less-willing types they might have been. (Here, there is 
only one size gift because the willing types only have to distinguish them- 
selves from one other type of less-willing player.) 
Another complication is competitive gift giving. Often, people involve 
several suitors in bidding wars (or tolerate such wars). In my simple 
S190 
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model, the ith suitor's gift should cost P' (the ith suitor's assessment of the 
probability that the courted player 2 is willing to invest in suitor i) times 
CQ(U) (the ith suitor's gain from cheating). A suitor will give larger gifts if 
he (a) is more confident hat the courted player is in love with him or (b) 
has more to gain by giving a gift and then cheating. Since the courted 
player is assumed to know whom he is in love with better than the suitors 
do, the only information that gifts convey is about the gains suitors would 
get from cheating. Perhaps a courted player should settle for the suitor 
who bids lowest (i.e., has the least to gain from cheating) not highest. 
Competitive gift giving probably signals wealth, or some other attribute, 
rather than willingness (though the wealth of a suitor might indeed affect 
the courted player's attitude toward the suitor). 
Interpreting the Equilibria as Conventions 
Of course, people do not actually court each other and give gifts in the 
artificial, abstract way depicted by the noncooperative game. It is better 
to think of the different equilibria pictured in figure 1 as social conven- 
tions that dictate what gifts (if any) are appropriate for what occasions, 
how expensive gifts should be, and so on. The conventional exchange of 
token gifts (flowers, special efforts in grooming or fashion) on initial dates 
may be an institutionalization of the two-sided signaling equilibrium 
when willingness is unlikely. Other rules of etiquette dictate when it is 
appropriate form for only one person to give a gift (as in my one-sided 
gift-giving equilibria). Lavish signaling usually takes place before impor- 
tant times, when heavy investment makes Q(W) especially costly-as 
when a woman (and, less so, a man) expects a child, or when people start 
to live together or buy a house10-because a larger Q(W) raises the 
thresholds t1 and t2 and requires signaling for investment o take place. 
Social rules that prescribe gift giving might be thought of as cultural 
calculations of equilibria, which prescribe behavior even when individ- 
uals make no such calculations (cf. von Neumann and Morgenstern's 
"standards of behavior" [1953, pp. 31 ff.]). 
OTHER EXPLANATIONS FOR INEFFICIENCY 
Analysis of the noncooperative game in which players exchange gifts that 
indicate their willingness, then invest, yields the following results: (i) if 
10 For instance, housewarming presents are signals from friends and neighbors that the 
large burden of owning a house without help, analogous to Q(W) in the courtship 
game, will be shared. 
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the chances that partners will invest willingly in a relationship are large 
enough (relative to their costs and benefits), then no gift giving is needed; 
(ii) if the chances that both players will invest are low enough, reciprocal 
gift giving can signal players' types and ensure their investments; (iii) if 
one player's chance of investing is low and another's is sufficiently high, 
then only the low-probability player should give a gift to the high- 
probability player, and investment will then take place; and (iv) if there is 
some cost even to entering the gift-giving-investment game, then ineffi- 
cient gifts will serve a useful purpose by discouraging unwilling players 
from entering the game. The game, while simple, begins to account for 
some of the basic stylized facts, since conclusion (iii) shows that reciproc- 
ity is not essential and conclusion (iv) provides a rationalization for 
inefficient gift giving. 
In the formal model, impractical gifts are good because they deter 
unwillingly players from engaging in insincere gift giving simply to collect 
gifts. (And, even then, efficient gifts are preferred in mature relationships 
where probabilities of willingness are high.) This explanation may ac- 
count for some instances of deliberately inefficient gift giving-when 
dates exchange trinkets during courtship, for instance-but the deter- 
rence motive for inefficient gift giving does not ring true for many other 
kinds of gift giving (especially in mature relationships). Three other 
classes of explanations are now offered. 
Inefficiency as the Price of Multidimensional Gift Giving 
If the sheer cost of a gift signals something about the giver and the specific 
choice of gift signals something else, then the inefficiency of the specific 
gift is simply the social price one pays for buying gifts that signal more 
than one thing at once.1" Indeed, it would be a pleasant, rare surprise if 
gifts that are appropriately costly and convey the right message happen to 
be the gifts that receivers want. 
Consider a large class of gifts that signal $50's worth of willingness: $50 
in cash, a $50 health-club gift certificate, $50 in sushi, a $50 bottle of 
wine, $50's worth of underwear, $50's worth of poetry, a $50 subscription 
to Spin. Each gift in this class signals willingness equally well ($50's 
worth), but each gift signals something else-tastes the giver has or hopes 
the receiver develops (Spin); how carefully the giver was listening when 
the receiver discussed food or wine (sushi, wine); or how much the giver 
appreciates the receiver's bodily (underwear) or intellectual (poetry) 
charms or thinks those bodily charms need maintaining (health club). 
" This is hinted at by Posner (1980, p. 25): "Notice that, viewed as a signaling device, 
a gift need not actually be received or enjoyed by the donee." 
S 192 
Gifts 
Inefficiency as the Price of Convention 
Many gifts signal things by convention (Lewis 1969) or custom (Akerlof 
1980), and these conventional gifts are often inefficient. The cigars a 
proud father might distribute to signal the birth of a child are probably 
not smoked, nowadays, but they are unmistakable signals.12 Indeed, 
most gift giving between friends or distant relatives may be of this con- 
ventional sort. 
Conventional gifts are not necessarily inefficient. When the practice of 
cigar giving began, for instance, probably most men did enjoy cigars. 
However, conventions arise to coordinate behavior among people who 
cannot communicate with one another easily (Lewis 1969), so when 
things change and a more efficient signaling convention becomes avail- 
able, it is difficult, by the nature of conventions, to coordinate change 
from the old convention to a new one. A classic example is the QWERTY 
typewriter keyboard, which has not been widely replaced by the more 
efficient Dvorak keyboard (David 1985). 
Thus, tradition rules by tyranny. If flowers are what well-intentioned 
gentlemen give young ladies on first dates, then gentlemen give flowers in 
order to be thought of as well intentioned, even if young ladies would 
rather be cooked a meal or sung a song. The inefficiency ofconventional 
gift giving is the price one pays for communicating in a common lan- 
guage. 
Noting that gift giving is circumscribed by convention helps explain 
why gift-giving rules are often enforced without tangible means or sanc- 
tions against deviance (see Caplow 1984). Conventions, like language, are 
"self-enforcing": an English speaker has no incentive to deviate from 
speaking English if others are speaking English, because English will 
communicate best-similarly with gift giving, which Caplow (1984) calls 
"a language that employs objects instead of words as its lexical elements." 
Inefficiency as the Price of Error in Guessing Tastes 
In mature relationships in which people know something about each 
other's tastes, the ideal gift seems to be one that a person likes but did not 
realize he liked. Good gift giving thus involves guessing a gift receiver's 
tastes, which often produces inefficiency. 
Suppose a friend of mine is either a close friend, who knows my tastes 
well, or a casual friend, who does not know my tastes. Close friends can 
distinguish themselves from casual friends by giving me things I like. It is 
12 Cigars signal the birth of a child, of course. Schwartz (1967, p. 2) argues further 
that, if gifts convey the identities of givers, then cigar giving is a "display of masculin- 
ity," and he intimates exactly what "the new father's gift cigar symbolizes." 
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useful for me to know whether a friend is a close or casual one because 
that knowledge guides my investment in our relationship (assuming that I 
prefer a relationship with a friend who knows my tastes), just as knowing 
whether a partner is willing to invest guides my investment. When my 
friend surprises me with an obscure Husker Dii recording, he reveals his 
knowledge of my tastes (along with his willingness to invest, as in the 
model above) with an efficient gift. His gifts are guesses about what I like, 
and sometimes these guesses will be wrong; gifts will be inefficient. This 
occasional inefficiency cannot be avoided by asking me what I like, be- 
cause even a casual friend could do that. A close friend must guess at my 
tastes (and sometimes err) to distinguish imself from a casual friend. 
The degree of inefficiency here need not be large, but there will often be 
some inefficiency. A person who knows my tastes quite well will buy gifts 
with efficiencies distributed around one. 13 Half the time I will get 
inefficient gifts, but it is the thought (i.e., the effort o guess) that counts. 
EXPLAINING STYLIZED FACTS 
I have offered four explanations for why gifts are typically inefficient: 
(1) Inefficient gifts deter insincere gift collectors from entering into a 
relationship (this explanation also emerges from a formal analysis). (2) 
Gifts might signal several different hings at once, and inefficiency is
simply the price of multidimensional signaling. (3) Gifts often acquire 
their meanings from convention (as language does), and conventions need 
not be efficient. (4) When people want to signal their knowledge of a gift 
receiver's tastes by gift giving, they must guess the receiver's tastes. They 
sometimes guess wrong and give inefficient gifts the receiver does not 
like. 
All these explanations begin with the simple notion that gifts are sig- 
nals of some characteristic of the gift giver. Besides accounting for gift 
inefficiency inseveral ways, the signaling view, common to all four expla- 
nations, accommodates a wide range of evidence about gift-giving prac- 
tices. For example, Caplow (1984) notes strict compliance with the rule 
that "a Christimas gift should . . . be scaled in economic value to the 
emotional value of the relationship." A DeBeers diamond ad reads, "2 
months salary showed the future Mrs. Smith what the future will be 
like." These are remarkably clear statements of the signaling view (see 
inequalities [6] and [7], above). However, the signaling view does not 
13 Gifts with efficiencies greater than one are things that I did not know existed but 
that I would have bought if I knew about them. Thaler (1985) argues that many goods 
(liquor, chocolates) have efficiencies greater than one but are avoided because they are 
addictive-consuming a little leads to consumption of too much. Self-control can be 
maintained by only consuming these goods if they are given as gifts. 
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explain many gift-giving practices, especially in families. I first discuss 
some stylized facts that fit the signaling view, and then I discuss stylized 
facts that do not fit. 
Why "It's the Thought That Counts" 
Any net cost of time, energy, or imagination is part of the signaling cost of 
a gift: the thought does count. Since such resources are nonsalvageable, 
they make gift giving inefficient (unless they substitute for the receiver's 
normal shopping). When vacationers bring back trinkets or send post- 
cards to loved ones, they remind receivers at home that the giver is 
thinking about them, thus signaling by their thoughts (and possibly tak- 
ing advantage of international price differences as well). 
Holidays as Focal Points for Simultaneous Gift Giving 
In the game-theoretic models, players are assumed to signal simulta- 
neously, but they actually prefer to signal last (to avoid wasting gifts on a 
partner found to be unwilling). If gift giving is cooperative, simultaneity 
is assumed, but, if gift giving is noncooperative, it is useful to have some 
occasions on which it is commonly known that gifts hould be exchanged 
to avoid the problem of who gives the gift first.14 Holidays serve this 
purpose well. They are "focal points," psychologically prominent points 
on which expectations converge. Of course, holidays serve other purposes 
too, and holidays do not always conveniently occur when simultaneous 
gift giving is needed-hence, the function of engagement rings, lavish 
wedding expenses, graduation gifts, and so on. 
Holidays occur regularly, but the appropriate rate of signaling occa- 
sions should be as fast or slow as the rate of change in a partner's willing- 
ness. Teenage lovers might celebrate their "anniversary" every month, 
while long-married couples might only celebrate important anniversaries 
every five or 10 years. 
Birth Control and Premarriage Gift Giving 
Arguing purely by analogy with Dawkins's (1976) biological account, I 
suggest an important motive for gift giving from men to women before 
marriage is that marriage typically obligates a woman to bear children. 
Since it is very costly for women to bear children alone, and men are 
always tempted to desert the marriage after conception (arguing by anal- 
4 See Andrew Schotter's (1980, pp. 31-35) example of how the weekly calendar 
coordinated trade. 
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ogy, remember), the premarriage gifts men give, such as an engagement 
ring, are like the nests that male birds build to pledge their fidelity to 
female birds. Of course, this story has changed dramatically in modern 
times, since marriage no longer obligates a woman, either socially or 
physically, to bear children (because of changing mores, modern birth 
control, and legalized abortion). Therefore, we might expect to see a 
decline in the traditional premarriage exchange of gifts from men to 
women, though important gifts (like diamonds) will still be useful to 
signal intentions on nonmarriage occasions. (Note that diamond com- 
panies have recently begun advertising that women should buy diamonds 
for their men.) 
Generic Gifts 
Between strangers or relatives whose tastes are unknown, conventional 
gifts that are exchanged often come from a small number of "generic" 
classes. Chocolates and candy, liquor, flowers, and jewelry are typical. 
Although I argued above that these gifts are simply conventional, there 
may be some reasons (besides historical accident) why these gifts, rather 
than others, became conventional. 
Two features of these generic gifts make them good gifts. First, flowers 
and candy are perishable (though liquor and jewelry are not), so the 
recipient must often consume the gift more quickly than he would prefer, 
to avoid spoilage-hence, some inefficiency. Second, virtually everyone's 
utility for these products is continually increasing in price. 15 Since quality 
is usually an increasing function of price, the giver can be fairly sure a 
high-cost version of one of these gifts is somewhat efficient ( hough not 
perfectly so), because the receiver will appreciate the quality (everyone 
likes fine chocolate), though not as much as he would like the equivalent 
amount of cash required to buy the high-cost version. 
Gift Giving in Business Relationships 
Often, long-term business or political relationships16 are economically 
identical to personal relationships, so we are not surprised by the "fictive 
friendships" that develop (see, e.g., Moore 1973). Anecdotal evidence 
is Not so true of beer, which is not as appropriate a generic gift as wine or liquor, nor 
of caviar or art or many other possible classes of generic gifts. 
16 Posner (1980, p. 24) notes: "Gift-giving remains a custom in visits between heads of 
state; the lack of supranational government prevents the formal enforcement ofprom- 
ises and so makes the assessment of character and intentions more critical than in 
transactions enforceable by a public judiciary." 
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suggests that courtship of top executives, often with material gift giving, 
is an important precursor to a successful corporate "marriage" (Wall 
Street Journal 1982). To explain involuntary labor-market unemploy- 
ment, Akerlof (1982, 1984) suggests that hard work and above-market 
wages (which result in a shortage of jobs) are like an exchange of gifts 
between employers and employees who "develop sentiment" for each 
other. A similar idea dominates recent theories of product-quality assur- 
ance, in which firms buy inefficient gifts of advertising (Klein and Leffler 
1981) or give gifts of high-quality goods sold at low-quality prices (Sha- 
piro 1983) to signal their intention to produce high-quality goods. 
When investments in a business relationship are transaction specific 
and costly, Williamson (1983) advocates the exchange of "hostages" (or 
hostage holding of capital commitments) that are valuable to the giver 
and worth little to the receiver (cf. Murrell [1982] on countertrade be- 
tween countries). This is precisely inefficient gift giving, except that in 
business settings the cost of gifts needed to ensure each side's investment 
can be so huge that exchanging gifts permanently is extremely inefficient. 
Lending gifts eems more sensible (and incurs a signaling cost in the lost 
opportunity of using the gift while it is lent), so that if the relationship is 
severed agreeably the gifts can be retrieved and massive inefficiency is
avoided. 
Caplow (1982) notes that, at Christmas, employers routinely give 
money gifts to employees. These "gifts" are more like bonuses, which 
serve as incentive devices (cf. tipping of service employees), than like 
personal gifts of the sort I have considered. 
Some Anomalous Stylized Facts 
Some gift-giving practices are obviously inconsistent with the broad view 
that gifts are signals. 
Why are price tags not left on gifts?-If gifts are signals, why are price 
tags not left on gifts? This is an important flaw in the signaling account. 
Perhaps keeping the price unknown cushions either the giver or receiver 
against disappointment if the gift cost much more or much less than we 
would prescribe (cf. Sabini and Silver [1982, pp. 107-23] on the protec- 
tive ambiguity of flirting). In this regard, note Caplow's (1984) observa- 
tion that parents rarely photograph their children with all their gifts 
unwrapped (though they often photograph children surrounded by 
wrapped gifts), because to do so "seems to invite the invidious compari- 
son of gifts-and of the relationships they represent." Perhaps, by 
avoiding such comparison, whether by removing price tags or by making 
taboo the photographic omparison among gifts, givers and receivers can 
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believe their relationships (as signaled by the gift) are better than they are. 
Put differently, the overt pricing of a relationship "taints affection with 
marketplace values" (Hemenway 1984, p. 59) and denies gift receivers the 
chance to believe that their relationships with gift givers are priceless. 
Gift giving in families.-Since families are voluntary organizations 
formed by parents and having children who necessarily belong, there is 
no process of courtship to imply that gifts are signals. Instead, gifts from 
parents may shape or educate a child's tastes, or they may be control 
mechanisms to reward or punish children.17 
As children grow up, parents' gifts to them become more and more 
efficient, thus resembling intergenerational transfers of wealth (as when 
parents give adult children gifts of cash) rather than signals. (Caplow 
[1982, p. 386] noted that at Christmas "nearly all money gifts between kin 
were intergenerational nd 'downward.' ") 
Children's gifts to parents-often charmingly homemade and ugly, 
with no direct utility value to parents-signal the child's affection but not 
exactly as in courtship. Instead, gift giving by children may give those 
children practice and familiarity with the norms of gift giving and with 
the process of imagining suitable gifts, so that as adults they can give gifts 
well. 
In general, familial gift giving is more like primitive premarket ex- 
change-as in the anthropological accounts, where gifts provide social 
insurance-than like signaling during courtship, so the inefficiencies that 
are important for signaling purposes need not be present in gift giving in 
the family. 
When efficient gifts are appropriate.-When parents give cash as a 
wedding present o their children, that strikingly cold gift draws attention 
to the end of the parent-child relationship (for, if the relationship were 
intended to endure, an inefficient gift would be more appropriate). Per- 
haps this gesture blesses the marriage, signaling trust in the child's new 
spouse and acknowledging the validity of the child's new family. (Of 
course, this works heuristically, not precisely. Suppose parents and chil- 
dren understand the signaling analysis and follow a rule of thumb like 
"giving people exactly what they want is not right if you care about 
them." Then a deliberate cash gift is a polite way of saying, "We care 
about you less"-translated, "You are free to care less about us and more 
about your new family. ") 
17 Hence, the invention of Santa Claus, who appears in a remarkable variety of cul- 
tures and is omniscient-Santa Claus "knows when you've been bad or good," as the 
song goes-so that his Christmas rewards can control child behavior better than 
parents can. The number of gifts a child receives, rather than the nature of the gifts, is 
the essence of the punishment or reward. See Schwartz (1967, p. 4). 
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Gifts in memory of the dead are often deliberately efficient as well (such 
as contributions to a specified charity), perhaps because the forward- 
looking relationship, signaled by inefficient gifts, is ended. One implica- 
tion of this view (which seems false) is that people will not give gifts in 
memory of the dead unless they have ongoing relationships with surviv- 
ing family members. Another implication (also wrong) is that the amount 
of contributions should be known to the surviving family members. Usu- 
ally, the amounts are not publicized, perhaps for the same reasons that 
price tags are removed from gifts. 
CONCLUSION 
Gift giving is puzzling from an economic perspective because it is 
inefficient-givers spend money on gifts differently from the way receiv- 
ers would-and it seems to be necessarily so. Other social sciences- 
anthropology and sociology, for instance-are full of explanations for gift 
giving, but these seem either too primitive or too complicated to be use- 
ful, and neither science describes a function for inefficiency (perhaps 
because neither science is as bothered by inefficiency as economists are). 
However, the sociologists' insistence that gifts convey meaning is much 
like the economists' idea that gifts are "signals" of information-that is, 
the intentions of partners in a personal relationship. One can show for- 
mally that inefficiency is necessary because the value of gifts received 
subsidizes the cost of gifts given, and inefficient gifts deter partners who 
are unwilling to invest from simply collecting gifts. The variety of 
sociological explanations for gift giving suggests a second explanation, 
that gifts might serve multiple signaling purposes simultaneously- 
signaling "willingness" to invest in a relationship, while also conveying 
meaning about the giver's tastes or identity or beliefs about the receiver. 
A third explanation for inefficiency is that the meaning of gifts is often 
conventional and arbitrary. Since convention is hard to change, once 
established, inefficient gift giving could persist. A fourth explanation is 
that gifts are signals of how much a gift giver knows about the receiver's 
tastes. If so, gifts are necessarily guesses about tastes that are sometimes 
wrong; therefore, gifts are sometimes inefficient. 
The signaling view accounts for some stylized facts about modern prac- 
tices of gift giving-the thought counts, holidays coordinate gift giving 
that is not naturally simultaneous, and so on. While the analysis seems 
especially appropriate for simple gift giving during courtship and in some 
business settings, it is not well suited to gift giving in families or to 
explaining pure charity. 
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APPENDIX: DETAILS OF THE SIGNALING AND INVESTMENT 
GAME 
Following the notation used in the main text and Harsanyi's (1967-68) 
definition of an incomplete-information game as one in which players 
have common knowledge about each other's (privately informed) types, I
show the normal-form game matrix for the investment game in table Al. 
(Only l's payoffs are shown, for simplicity; 2's are symmetric.) 
While the role of investment may seem contrived and artificial, without 
an investment-theoretic definition of the relationship, players have no 
incentive to lie, so no signals are needed. By adding investment, we give a 
noninvesting player something to gain from riding free, so we provide a 
motive for some players to lie about their investment plans, and we create 
an information problem that signaling can solve. 
In the game in table Al, (W, I; U, N) is always preferred to (W, I; U, 
I)-that is, U-type players never invest. (W, I; U, N) is preferred to (W, 
N; U, N), conditional on the other player choosing (W, I; U, N) (i.e., W- 
type players invest) if and only if their expected value from investing is 
above their expected value from not investing. For player 1, these ex- 
pected values are 
EV,(I) = P2R(W) + (1 - P2)Q(W) (Al) 
EV1(N) = P2C(W) + (1 -P2) 
so a W-type player will invest if and only if (iff) EV,(I) > EV1(N), or 
P2 > -Q(W)I[R(W) - Q(W) - C(W)]. (A2) 
If we define the right-hand side as an "investment hreshold" t1 for player 
1, 1 invests iff P2 > t,. A W-type player 2 invests if a symmetric condition 
holds: 
Pl > - Q(W)I[R(W) - Q(W) - C(W)] (= t2) (A3) 
The unique Bayesian Nash equilibria are these:18 (1) If both probabilities 
are above their thresholds t, and t2, players choose (W, I; U, N). (2) If 
either probability is below its threshold, then one W-type player will not 
invest, so the other W-type player will not invest either, and the players 
both choose (W, N; U, N). If equilibrium (2) results, then signaling is 
needed. 
18 There are no mixed-strategy equilibria. W-types will always prefer I to any mixed- 
strategy play of I and N, conditional on their partner's probability being above its 
threshold. Intuitively, itseems that U-types might sometimes play I, if their probabili- 
ties are below their threshold, to coax their partner into playing L. However, U-types' 
sometimes playing I is not a Nash equilibrium, since, if their mixed-strategy play does 
induce their partners to play I, the U-types then prefer playing N with probability one. 
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I follow the notation in the text for the costs (G1 and G2) and efficiencies 
(ei, e2) of gifts, carefully noting that all of l's receipts and costs have a 
marginal utility of income L1 attached to them (and similarly for 2), which 
I omit for clarity. I also assume that utilities for gifts given, for gifts 
received, and for joint production are additively separable and indepen- 
dent between players. Adding within- or between-player utility inter- 
dependencies-such as gifts' having less utility cost when you are in love 
with the gift receiver-makes it easy to explain inefficient gift giving. I 
take the more challenging route. 
In the two-stage signaling-investment game, players choose contin- 
gency strategies pecifying whether they will invest in the signal depend- 
ing on their type and invest in the relationship depending on whether the 
other person signaled. I assume initially that this two-period game is 
played noncooperatively, and I restrict heir choice of strategies to giving 
gifts of size zero or G1 (e.g., for player 1). There are a variety of pure- 
strategy equilibria, depending on the exact values of the probabilities and 
utilities. (These are actually "sequential" equilibria of a specific sort, 
which rules out certain implausible Nash equilibria; see below.) 
First, we can rule out "dishonest" signaling (W, 0; U, G): If dishonest 
signaling were part of a two-period Bayesian equilibrium, then a failure 
to signal in the first period would reveal a player as willing and would 
elicit investment from a willing partner in the second period. But then 
unwilling players would behave like willing players, not signaling in the 
first period to elicit second-period investment. So, dishonest signaling 
cannot be an equilibrium. 
Ruling out that contingency strategy enables us to summarize the 
normal-form game in a series of 3 x 3 payoff matrices (tables A2-A4) 
showing only player l's payoffs for simplicity. I study each possible equi- 
librium in turn. Figure 1 in the text summarizes how equilibria differ for 
different values of the W-type prior probabilities P1 and P2. 
Two-sided Signaling Equilibria (table A2) 
First, suppose that both prior probabilities P1 and P2 are below their 
thresholds, t, and t2, so that if players do nothing to change their partners' 
beliefs, then no investment will result in the second period. A separating 
equilibrium results if both players choose (W, G; U, 0)-only willing 
players invest in the signal, so players can be separated by whether they 
signal or not. Conditional on observing a signal, players infer with cer- 
tainty that their partner is a W-type, so W-types happily invest in the 
second period (and each earns R[W]). If they observe no signal, players 
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TABLE A2 
PLAYER i's EXPECTED PAYOFFS IN THE NONCOOPERATIVE 
INVESTMENT-SIGNALING GAME 
PLAYER 2'S PLAYER 1'S CONTINGENCY SIGNALING STRATEGIES 
CONTINGENCY 
STRATEGIES (W, G; U, G) (W, G; U, 0) (W, 0; U, 0) 
(W, G; U, G): 
S -G1 + f1G2 -P1G1 + f1G1 + f1G2 
I +0 +0 +0 
(W, G; U, 0): 
S -G1 +fiP2G2 -PIG1 +fiP2G2 +fiP2G2 
I + 0 + P1P2R(W) + 0 
(W, 0; U, 0): 
S -G0 -P1Gj O 
I + 0 + 0 + 0 
NOTE.-Assume PI < t, and P2 < t2. See also fig. 1. S and I denote payoffs from the signaling and 
investment parts of the game. 
infer that their partner is unwilling, so they do not invest in the second 
period. 
However, this is only an equilibrium if we make the signal expensive 
enough to deter U-types and cheap enough for W-types. Since a U-type 
player 1 earns an expected value of P2C(U) (and a W-type arns P2R[W]) 
from player 2's investing, to make the signal too expensive for the U-type 
players and cheap enough for W-type players we require: 
P2R(W) > G1 > P2C(U), (A4) 
P1R(W) > G2 > P1C(U). (A5) 
If the gift costs G satisfy these bounds, then the separating equilibrium 
(W, G; U, 0) results. 
There is no equilibrium mixed-strategy play here. Suppose a U-type 
player 1 bought the signal with probability S. When he did not buy the 
signal (a fraction 1-S of the time), he would earn nothing in the invest- 
ment game. When he did buy the signal (a fraction S of the time), his net 
earnings would be S[-G1 + P2C(U)], which is negative according to 
(A4). If the signal is expensive enough to deter a U-type from buying it all 
the time (i.e., if G1 > P2C[U]), then it also deters the U-type from ever 
buying it. By similar reasoning, it seems that W-types will not play mixed 
strategies either. If a willing player 1 tries to economize by not signaling, 
then player 2 will not invest, and the W-type player 1 will lose out on a 
fraction of P2R(W) to save a fraction of G1. By inequality (A4), this is a 
mistake, so a W-type always signals. 
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No-signaling Equilibrium with Investment (table A3) 
If both priors P1 and P2 are above their thresholds, t1 and t2, then players 
will invest in the second period even if they have learned nothing about 
their partner's type from the signaling. As a result, both types of players 
have no incentive to signal, and the result is a no-signaling equilibrium in 
which players do invest in the second period. 
No-signaling Equilibrium without Investment (table A4) 
Suppose one player's prior is below his threshold-P1 < tl, for instance, 
so that 2 will not invest-but P2 > t2, so that 1 will invest. Then, if a W- 
type player 1 does not signal, a W-type player 2 will not invest in the 
second period. 
However, if a W-type player 1 does signal, his expected value from the 
two-period game is: 
EV1(W, G1) = P2R(W) + (1 - P2)Q(W) - G1. (A6) 
If we make the gifts as cheap as possible to satisfy (A3) and (A4), setting 
G, = P2C(W), then it only pays for the W-type player 1 to signal if the 
expected value in (A6) is positive (since the W-type player 1 can always 
walk away from the game and earn zero). The expected value in (A6) is 
positive if P2 satisfies 
P2 > - Q(W)I[R(W) - Q(W) - C(U)]. (A7) 
(Notice that this threshold condition is almost exactly the same as the 
threshold condition [A2], except that C[W] in equality [A2] is replaced by 
C[U] in [A3].) Now, assuming C(W) < C(U),19 the threshold in (A7) is 
higher than the threshold t2, so there is a range of P2 in which a W-type 
player 1 is willing to invest but unwilling to pay the signaling cost to 
convince player 2 to invest. In this region (see fig. 1), no signaling (and, 
subsequently, no investment) takes place, and there is a symmetric region 
in which player 2 would like to signal but cannot afford to. 
Note that if C(W) > C(U), then the region in which players are willing 
to invest but not willing to signal disappears since the threshold in (A7) is 
below the threshold in (A2). 
19 To justify this logic, C(U) and C(W) must be comparable. This is a strong assump- 
tion, since a willing-type player and an unwilling-type layer might be considered 
different people, and interpersonal comparisons of utility are notoriously problematic 
if not impossible. But here we can place the burden of comparability on the incomplete 
information structure of the game: because the players do not know the exact types of 
their partners, it seems reasonable to assume that players could agree on everything 
short of those exact types, thus allowing hypothetical interval comparisons of all the 
utilities in definitions (4) and (5) in the text. 
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TABLE A4 
PLAYER 1'S EXPECTED PAYOFFS IN THE NONCOOPERATIVE INVESTMENT-SIGNALING 
GAME 
PLAYER 2'S PLAYER 1'S CONTINGENCY SIGNALING STRATEGIES 
CONTINGENCY 
STRATEGIES (W, G; U, G) (W, G; U, 0) (W, 0; U, 0) 
(W, G; U, G): 
S -G1 +fiG2 -PIG, +fG2G2 
I + 0 +PlP2R(W) + Pi(I - P2)Q(W) +0 
+ O + 0
(W, G; U, 0): 
S -G1 + Pjf1G2 -P1Gl + P2f1G2 +P2f1G2 
I +0 +PlP2R(W) + 0 +0 
+ O + 0
(W, 0; U, 0): 
S -0G -P,Gl ? 
I +0 PIP2R(W) + Pj(1 - P2)Q(W) +0 
+ 0 +0 
NOTE.-Assume P1 < t1 and P2 > t2. See also fig. 1. S and I denote payoffs from the signaling and 
investment periods of the game. 
By arguments analogous to those for the two cases above, there are no 
mixed-strategy equilibria here either. U-types cannot afford to signal with 
any probability, and W-types will never want to economize on signaling. 
One-sided Signaling Equilibria (table A4) 
Suppose P2 is above the investment hreshold t2 and above the affordabil- 
ity threshold in (A7) but P1 is below tl. Then the low prior P1 makes 
player 2 afraid to invest in the second period without a signal from player 
1, so a W-type player 1 wants to signal player 2 (and can afford to). A 
"one-sided" signaling equilibrium results (see fig. 1) in which 1 signals to 2 
if 2 is likely to be willing but 1 is unlikely, or vice versa. (Intuitively, the 
player who is most likely to be a U-type must signal to his partner. The 
sincere must convince the skeptic, not the other way around.) 
Nash versus Sequential (and Perfect) Equilibrium 
I have called the four kinds of equilibria above Nash equilibria, but this is 
not quite accurate. In dynamic games, Nash equilibria are often perverse 
because they involve threats that are not credible. In the no-signaling 
region, for example (where the priors P1 and P2 are above the investment 
thresholds), the strategy (W, G; U, 0) for both players is one Nash equilib- 
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rium, because if everyone thinks he must give a gift o attract investment, 
he will give gifts. But what if many W-type players did not give gifts? 
Presumably, they would still attract investment, so the threat that is 
implicit in the equilibrium, to invest only if given a gift, is not credible. 
A common way to rule out such equilibria is to test them for "subgame 
perfection"-that is, to ask whether an equilibrium is an equilibrium in 
every possible subgame from period t to the end, even for subgames that 
are not expected to be reached (Selten 1975). An equilibrium is "sequen- 
tial" if it is subgame perfect (or "trembling-hand perfect," if no subgames 
exist) and if a few other technical requirements are satisfied (see Kreps 
and Wilson 1982). Many Nash equilibria are not sequential (like [W, G; 
U, 0] in the above-threshold region), but all sequential equilibria are 
Nash ones. All the equilibria described above are sequential. However, 
there may be other sequential equilibria that I am ignoring. 
The Efficiency of Equilibrium Gifts 
The signaling equilibria, if they exist, restrict how costly gift signals G1 
and G2 must be (to satisfy inequalities [A4] and [A5]), but no natural 
limits on gift efficiency emerge. As discussed in the text, we can derive 
efficiency bounds by expanding the game to include small costs T1 and T2 
(with marginal utilities of income attached) of entering the first-period 
signaling game. These costs, and appropriate fficiency bounds, discour- 
age U-types from entering the game. However, a W-type player 1 has a 
net expected value of - T- G1 + elG2P2 + P2R(W). This expression is 
positive if el just satisfies the threshold (8) because then the first and third 
terms cancel out, and, since G1 = P2C(U), it is less than P2R(W) (because 
R[W] > C[U] by assumption). 
Inefficient gifts help deter, but they can hurt willing players. A W-type 
player 1, for instance, earns - G1 + P2G2 in net gift receipts if efficient 
gifts are given, but, if the efficiency thresholds in (8) and (9) are enforced 
and a U-type player 2 does not enter the game, then a W-type player 1 
earns expected net gift receipts of P2(- G1 + elG2) - T1 and expected 
relationship gains of P2R(W). (These net gains are always positive, so W- 
types are not discouraged from entering the game as U-types are, assum- 
ing e's are chosen to make [8] and [9] bind. Then the terms P2elG2 and 
-T1 cancel, and P2R[W] - P2G1 is positive.) Assuming the efficiency 
values are as large as possible within the bounds (8) and (9), the W-type 
player 1 prefers the inefficient-gift scheme if P2(1 - P2) < G11G2. Com- 
bining this inequality for W-type player 2 with an analogous condition for 
player 1 yields condition (10) in the text. 
Note that we can smooth this discontinuous jump from preferring 
inefficient to efficient gift giving that is embodied in (A10) by supposing 
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that there are probability distributions of the costs T1 and T2, so that gifts 
with differing degrees of efficiency will screen out differing numbers 
of unwilling-type gift collectors. Then, the optimal efficiency level will 
gradually rise as the probabilities P1 and P2 rise. 
Inefficiency Signals If Gift Costs Are Identical 
Suppose we restrict he costs of gifts given by W-types and U-types to 
being identical, as if we were enforcing some social norm that requires 
suitors to give a gift of a certain cost during courtship. If players can then 
specify the degree of inefficiency in the gift they will receive, players can 
signal their types by asking for efficient gifts (U-types) or for inefficient 
gifts (W-types). This is the formalization of my argument hat the oppor- 
tunity cost of an inefficient gift to a receiver is itself a signal. 
Suppose the equilibrium efficiencies are eu and ew (and suppose they are 
different, so that players' choices of efficiency signal their types). The U- 
type player 1 can choose eu and earn 
-G1 + e,G2, (A8) 
or choose e, and earn 
-G1 + ewG2 + P2C(U) (A9) 
(and similarly for player 2). The W-type player 1 can choose eu and earn 
-G1 + euG2 (Alo) 
or choose ew and earn 
-G1 + ewG2 + P2R(W). (A1) 
For players to signal their true types, (A8) must be greater than (A9), and 
(Al1) must be greater than (A10). For player 1, for instance, this implies 
P2R(W) > G2(eu - ew) > P2C(U), (A12) 
and, since both expressions on the right and the left of the inequality are 
positive, this implies eu must be greater than ew. That is, players can 
be distinguished by whether they ask for practical gifts they can use 
("money, please" or "let me pick my favorite restaurant") or for frivolous 
gifts ("give me something charming," surprise me"). 
Gift Giving in a Cooperative Game 
Cooperation-defined in game theory as the ability to communicate 
about and enforce the strategy choices of players-seems realistic in 
many gift-giving situations: partners do talk about gift giving in relation- 
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ships, including discussions of gift costs and whether gifts should be 
efficient or not. Furthermore, the assumption of cooperation is probably 
best suited to mature relationships where P1 and P2 are presumably above 
their thresholds (else, the relationship would not have lasted) and where 
signaling does not take place noncooperatively. 
Cooperative games with incomplete information are not as directly 
solved as noncooperative games, since there is no simple leap like Har- 
sanyi's (1967-68) to transform incomplete-information games into com- 
plicated complete-information games. Instead, I consider solutions to 
cooperative games with incomplete information with the properties of 
"feasibility" and "incentive efficiency."20 
A feasible solution satisfies two criteria: individual rationality and in- 
centive compatibility. Solutions must be individually rational in the sense 
that each player has a positive expected value from the solution. Incen- 
tive compatibility means that players must play honestly, given their 
types (i.e., they should not prefer pretending to be another type). We 
assume that a solution is actually implemented using a "direct mecha- 
nism": players agree on a solution that prescribes a strategy for each of the 
player's possible types, then they report a type (though not necessarily 
their true type) to a mediator, who implements the solution and executes 
strategy choices based on the type reports. While the direct mechanism 
sounds contrived, by the "revelation principle" (Myerson 1979), any 
Bayesian equilibrium of the gift-giving game has an equivalent solution, 
implemented by a direct mechanism that yields the same outcomes. Thus, 
by studying only solutions implemented with direct mechanisms, we are 
actually studying all equilibria of the game. 
An incentive-efficient solution is one that yields expected values for 
each player (and each possible type) that could not be improved on by 
another solution for every player and type. (This definition of efficiency, 
called "interim incentive-efficiency" by Holmstrom and Myerson [1983], 
is a straightforward extension of Pareto optimality, treating each player's 
possible type as a separate player. Note the distinction between incentive 
efficiency, which is a property of possible solutions considered by the 
players, and the efficiency of gifts, which is the value of those gifts to 
recipients.) 
I shall first analyze the gift-giving ame, played cooperatively, for 
feasible solutions; then I shall use incentive efficiency as a criterion to 
suggest one particularly plausible class of solutions. It will turn out that 
the class of incentive-efficient solutions is the same as the "two-sided, gift- 
20 One might also ask whether solution concepts are "equitable," in order to prescribe a 
solution or to predict how players with equal bargaining ability will bargain. See 
Myerson (1983, 1984). 
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giving investment" equilibrium-with no implications for efficiency 
levels el and e2-in the noncooperative game. 
Feasibility Constraints on Cooperative Solutions 
By cooperation, I mean that the players agree on a vector of gift costs and 
efficiencies that depend on a player's type, then they report their types 
(possibly falsely) to the mediator, who makes them buy the gifts and 
exchange them. I shall restrict our choice of cooperative solutions to those 
that signal perfectly each player's type when the gifts are bought and 
exchanged; so the investment game that follows the gift giving is a 
straightforward complete-information game in which W-types only invest 
if their partners are W-types. 
Let the gift costs and efficiencies for player 1 be written (W, Gw, elw; U, 
Gi, el), and similarly for player 2. (Notice that players choose the effi- 
ciency of the gift they will recieve, el for player 1, not the efficiency of the 
gifts they give.) The players' expected payoffs from the game, depending 
on their types and assuming that they report heir types honestly and that 
the solution reveals each player's type, are: 
EV1(W) = -G2w + P2[ewGw + R(W)] + (1 - P2)(eYwGu) (A13) 
EV1(U) -Gul + P2(eutGw) + (1 -PAOGu); 
EV2(W) = -Gw + Pl[ewGw + R(W)] + (1 - Pl)(ewGu) (A14) 
EV2(U) = -Gu' + Pl(eu'G7w) + (1 -Pl)(euGu). 
The individual rationality constraints imply require that each of these 
expected values is positive. The incentive-compatibility constraints re- 
quire that players prefer reporting their true types, so that the honest- 
reporting expected values in (A13) and (A14) are greater than the ex- 
pected values that result from lying (assuming everyone else reports 
honestly). For player 1, for instance, incentive compatibility implies that 
EV1(W) > -Gl + P2(euG2w) + (1 - P2)(eu(Gu) 
EV1(U) > -Gw + P2[eYwGw + C(U)] + (1 - PAewGu), 
(where EV1[W] and EV1[U] are the expected values from [A13], and 
similarly for player 2). The feasibility constraints form a system of eight 
inequalities-four individual rationality (IR) constraints, one for each 
possible player type, and four incentive-compatibility (IC) constraints. 
First, I shall suppose that both players give perfectly efficient gifts 
(eu = ew = 1), and I shall calculate what gift costs are required for the 
eight constraints to be met. 
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With the e's equal to one, the IR constraints for player 1 are: 
o < -GXw + Gu + P2(Gw - Gu) + P2R(W) 
O < -Gu + Gu + P2 (Gw -Gu); 
O < Gu - Gw + P2R(W) (A17) 
O < -Gu + Gw - P2C(U). 
If we let the U-type IC constraints be binding for both players (which 
makes W-type the best off, as I show clearly below), we can eventually 
show after much tedious algebra that a solution exists, in which 
Gw = Gu + P1C(U) (A18) 
Gw = Gu + P2C(U). 
Thus, players exchange perfectly efficient gifts, but the sizes of the gifts 
players give distinguish their willingness. 
This solution is incentive efficient as well as feasible. (That is, there is 
no solution that makes all players better off. Indeed, every other feasible 
solution makes some players worse off.) To see this, I shall reframe the 
problem and consider alternative solutions one at a time. If I denote 
players' expected utilities from both gift giving and investment as VXw, and 
so on, then the constraints above are simply constraints on utilities. Re- 
membering what those utilities are, I can rewrite the IC and IR con- 
straints as 
VW 2? (IR) 
Vtl 2 0 (A19) 
V1 ?V1j (IC) 
Vlw Vu -P2C(U) + P2R(W) 
and 
VW2 ? (IR) 
Vu 2 0 (A20) 
V2' 2 V2 (IC) 
Vw2' V - P1C(U) + P1R(W). 
First, suppose the gifts have equal efficiency, which is less than one (i.e., 
eu = ew = c, c < 1), and compare this with the case analyzed above, in 
which eu = ew = 1. The IC constraints in (A15) are completely un- 
changed by lowering the efficiency from one to c, as long as efficiencies 
are equal (because only the difference in the efficiencies enters the IC 
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constraints), but both players' utilities are lower (since the utilities are an 
increasing linear function of the e's). Thus, the solution in which the ew 
= eu = c is not incentive fficient. Now compare the case where ew = eu 
= 1 with the case where gifts have differing efficiencies, with ew = 1 and 
eu = c (c < 1). By lowering eu, we lower Vu (by [A 13] and [A14]), and Vw 
must also be lower (by the second IC constraint), to discourage a U-type 
from pretending to be a W-type. This solution is thus worse for everyone 
than the solution eu = ew = 1. Finally, consider the case where ew = c (c 
< 1) and eu = 1. (This corresponds to the game considered above, in 
which players' gift costs are identical, but they can signal willingness by 
accepting low-efficiency gifts.) Here, we have lowered Vw directly and left 
Vu unchanged (unless it is lowered by the first IC constraint), so this 
solution is also worse than ew = eu = 1. 
Thus, by the process of elimination, we see that the solution ew = eu 
= 1 is incentive efficient. The intuition behind this result is that, by 
lowering any player's gift efficiency, we certainly make that player worse 
off, and we either make the other-type player no better off, or we make 
that player worse off because the IC constraints force player's utilities to 
be not far apart. 
Note that the gift costs in (A 18) are almost exactly the same as the 
(lower-bounded) gift costs from the noncooperative game (see [A4] and 
[A5]), except that we have let Gu be positive in the cooperative game and 
we restricted it to equalizing zero in the noncooperative game. The im- 
portant point is that a W-type player l's gift must cost P2C(U) more than a 
U-type player l's gift. Otherwise, the two games are exactly the same, 
except the two-sided gift-giving solution is incentive efficient for any 
probabilities in the cooperative game, while it is only an equilibrium for 
certain probabilities in the noncooperative game. 
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